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WORKING THROUGH THE STATIC: IS THERE ANYTHING LEFT
TO LOCAL CONTROL IN THE SITING OF CELLULAR AND PCS
TOWERS AFTER THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996?

I.

INTRODucTION

On February 8, 1996, in the elaborate reading room of the Library of
Congress, President Bill Clinton signed an historic piece of legislation heralded to unleash America's great competitive might.1 After several years
of partisan, corporate and consumer interest wrangling, the Telecommunications Act of 19962 ("TCA") became law. 3 The telecommunications industry in 1996 was a vastly different industry than when the last piece of
federal telecommunications legislation was written in 1934. 4 The telecommunications industry of 1934 consisted mainly of the radio networks and
the AT&T monopoly over telephone service. 5 By stark contrast, the telecommunications industry of the 1990s is vastly diversified, offering not
only traditional telephone, radio and television broadcasts, but also cable
television, direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") services, e-mail, the world
wide web, teleconferencing and personal wireless service ("PWS") such as
6
cellular phone service.
1. See Mike Mills, Usheringin a New Age in Communications;Clinton Signs 'Revolutionary'Billinto Law at a Ceremony Packed with Symbolism, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1996, at
C1 (reporting on signing of historic legislation). Before signing the legislation,
President Clinton said, "(I]t [the legislation] clearly enables the age of possibility
in America to expand to include more Americans. It will create many, many highwage jobs. It will provide more information and more entertainment to virtually
every American home." White House Publications, Remarks by the President in Signing Ceremony for the Telecommunications Act Conference Report (Feb. 8, 1996) (visited
Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi:/oma.eop.
gov.us/1996/2/8/9.text.1 >.
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codi-

fied as enacted and amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 47
U.S.C.).
3. See Richard Zoglin & Georgia Harbison, We're All Connected the Long-Awaited
TelecommunicationsBill Sweeps Away Old Boundaries. Get Ready for a Free-For-All, TIME,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 52 (stating that TCA's passage was fraught with partisan and interest group wrangling).
4. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AcT OF' 1996:
WHAT IT MEANS TO LoCAL GOVERNMENTS

5 (1996) (describing historical backdrop

of Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version
codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)); see also Robert A. Heverly,
Dealing with Towers, Antennas, and Satellite Dishes, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Nov.
1996, at 3 (explaining urban and rural problems with telecommunications during

1930s).
5. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing historical
urban and rural problems with telecommunications).
6. See Sara A. Evans, Note, Wireless Service Providers v. Zoning Commissioners: Preservationof State and Local Zoning Authority under the TelecommunicationsAct of

(781)
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The goal of the TCA was to deregulate the industry and to allow for
the expansion of new technologies. 7 Deregulation did not just involve dismantling federal regulation, but also dismantling any state or local regulation that constituted a barrier to entry into the market. 8 Specifically, the
TCA preempted some of local government's traditional zoning power over
the siting of PWS facilities, namely towers. 9 Although the TCA expressly
states that Congress preserved traditional zoning authority over PWS tower
sitings, a substantial portion of that authority was preempted.10 The issue
for both the courts and local governments is how much zoning authority
has been preserved. 11 Evidenced by a dizzying amount of litigation since
the TCA's passage in February of 1996, all of the players-the courts, zoning hearings boards, industry and the public at large-are confused and
concerned about this divisive issue.
This Comment will examine the capacity of a local government to
regulate the siting of PWS towers under the TCA. Part II will lay out a
picture of the debate both in historical and current contexts. It addresses
the rise of the PWS industry and what that rise means for local governments and their constituents.1 2 It then examines the goals of the TCA and
3
its regulatory or "de-regulatory" framework in the PWS tower siting area.'
Part III offers a detailed analysis of how the courts have interpreted the
1996, 32 GA. L. REv. 965, 973-74 (1998) (commenting on vast increase in existing
telecommunications technology).
7. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996) (stating that TCA provides, "a
pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate
rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications
markets to competition .... .").
8. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 4, at 13 (explaining that TCA
preempts state and local regulation prohibiting telecommunications providers
from entering market).
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (restricting ways that state
and local governments may zone siting of PWS facilities); see alsoJohn H. Gibbon,
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Its Impact of Municipal Regulation, 28 URB. L.
737, 74344 (1996) (describing TCA's restriction on zoning of PWS facilities);
Heverly, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing TCA restrictions).
10. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (stating that zoning authority is preserved yet
enumerating limitations thereof); see also Gregory Tan, Note, Wading Through the
Rhetoric of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Uncertaintyof Local Zoning Authority over
Wireless Telecommunications Tower Siting, 22 VT. L. REv. 461, 463-65 (1997) (explaining contradictory language of TCA that preserves yet limits zoning authority).
11. See Tan, supra note 10, at 463-65 (stating that scope of TCA limitations on
zoning of PWS facilities will have to be judicially determined).
12. For a discussion of the rise of the PWS industry and what that has meant
for local governments and their constituents, see infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the goals of the TCA and its regulatory or de-regulatory framework in the PWS tower siting area, see infra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
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breadth of the TCA's preemption of traditional zoning authority.' 4 Further, it examines the competing views on Congressional intent that underlie the federal courts' decisions-namely whether Congress intended
sweeping or limited preemption of state and local zoning law.1 5 Finally,
this Comment will argue that a narrow reading of the preemption provisions is the proper reading. 16 Part IV summarizes this Comment's
conclusions.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Wat Does the PWS Industry Mean for Local Government?

The purpose of this section is to give a brief overview of the PWS
industry, including a description of the relevant technology---cellular
verses personal communications service (PCS). Additionally, this section
will explore how the PWS industry has been accepted by local government.
1.

Overview of the PWS Industry

Fifteen years ago wireless telephones were almost unheard of, and
they conjured up images of scenes from Star Trek.1 7 Today, there are
nearly 38 million subscribers of wireless telephone services, a number that
is expected to explode to 124 million by 2005.18 The TCA uses the broad
term "personal wireless services" (PWS) to describe wireless telephones. 19
The PWS industry provides basically two different types of wireless telephone services-cellular phone service and PCS service. 20 Cellular technology provides wireless telephone service via the transmission of lowpower, point-to-point, two-way transmission radio waves. 2' Cellular technology employs a system of "cells" to maximize usage of allocated frequen14. For a discussion of how the courts have interpreted the breadth of the
TCA's preemption of traditional zoning authority, see infra notes 50-150 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the competing philosophies that underlie the federal
courts' decisions in this area, see infra notes 151-69 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of this Comment's conclusion that the proper interpretation of the preemption provisions is a narrow one, see infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
17. See Nancy M. 'Palermo, ProgressBefore Pleasure: Balancing the Competing Interests of Telecommunications Companies and Landowners in Cell Site Construction, 16 TEMP.
ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 245, 245 (1998) (noting that wireless telephone technology
was not available until about 1982 and that in 1985 there were only approximately
200,000 subscribers of cellular phone service).
18. See id. at 245-46 (commenting on rapid increase of wireless telephone service subscribers).
19. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (C) (i) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (using and defining
"personal wireless service").
20. See Tan, supra note 10, at 467-72 (explaining differences between cellular
and PCS wireless technology).
21. See id. at 467 (explaining cellular technology).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 7
784

VILLANOVA LAW REVwEw

[Vol. 44: p. 781

cies. 22 Cells are geographic areas, with each area containing a lowpowered radio transmitter. 23 The radio transmitters then connect the cellular phone user with the larger wired telephone network. 24 Although
some cellular systems use digital transmission technology, the majority still
employ conventional analog transmission technology. 25 Additionally, cellular systems require towers that are higher than PCS towers, but that
26
transmit over a larger cell.
Although PCS wireless service employs the same system of cells to integrate with the wired telephone network, it uses only digital transmission
technology and a much higher frequency than cellular systems. 27 Be-

cause, however, PCS systems operate at higher frequencies, they require a
28
greater number of towers in a given service area.

22. See

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ET AL., SITING CELLULAR TowERs: WHAT

You NEED To KNOw, WHAT You NEED To Do 3 (1997) (explaining how cell system
expands usage of FCC allocated frequencies). Because the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") allocates and limits the number of radio frequencies
that telecommunications companies can use, cellular technology employs cells to
maximize the usage of the FCC allocated frequencies. See id.
23. See Tan, supra note 10, at 467-69 (explaining cell concept).
24. See id. (stating idea of cell technology). The size and number of the cells
in a particular region vary with the volume of cellular phone calls that are made
therein. See id. (explaining why size and number of cells varies for different geographic coverage areas).
25. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CrEs, supra note 22, at 3 (noting that majority
of cellular systems are analog).
26. See Stanley D. Abrams, Update on the 1996 Telecommunications Act: Personal
Wireless Services, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Apr. 1998, at 3, 5 (explaining that
cellular phone towers or "monopoles" range from 150 feet to 199 feet in height
and service area with 2.5 mile radius). By contrast, PCS towers are not as high but
require a greater number because of the smaller service area. See id. (commenting
on height differences of cellular and PCS towers).
27. See Tan, supra note 10, at 472 (describing PCS technology).
28. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 5 (describing PCS need for greater number
of towers); see alsoJenaba Jalloh, Local Tower Siting Preemption: FCC Radio Frequency
Guidelines are Solution for Removing Barriers to PCS Expansion, 5 COMM. L. CONSPECTus 113, 113 (1997) (stating that "a PCS network requires four times the number
of antennas and towers to transmit signals in order to meet the same coverage as
cellular services").
Also related to the required number of towers for a given system type-PCS or
cellular-are the issues of coverage and capacity. Coverage relates to geographythe need to have a tower presence in a region to offer wireless service. See Abrams,
supra note 26, at 5 (distinguishing between coverage and capacity). Conversely,
capacity relates to a tower need given the level of wireless usage in a given region.
See id. When volume increases in a particular service area, capacity becomes an
issue-can the existing PWS infrastructure support the volume demanded. See id.
Beyond the technological differences, PCS technology can support an expanded array of services beyond wireless telephone service. See Tan, supra note 10,
at 471-72 (stating that PCS technology can support more services than cellular
technology). PCS systems can also provide paging and data transmission (facsimile
service), and in the future may be able to serve as a platform for computer
networking and wireless Internet access. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra
note 22, at 3 (explaining breadth of PCS technology).
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PWS Challenges Presented to Local Governments

Despite the dramatic increase in demand for wireless service, there
has been a correlative opposition to the siting of facilities needed to provide wireless service. 29 In areas where PWS towers have been proposed,
neighbors at zoning board hearings across the country have voiced their
concerns. 30 Concerns have ranged from diminution in property values, to
aesthetics and to health effects. 31 It has been the job of local government
to balance these two interests-the demand for high quality and readily
available PWS technology3 2 and citizen concerns over tower siting.33 Because of this increased demand for PWS technology, local officials cannot
avoid siting issues-local government, the PWS industry and residents
have been forced to work these issues out.
B.
1.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Siting of PWS Towers

Legislative History

Critics of the Communications Act of 1934 (the "CA")-the pre-TCA
federal regulatory framework-criticized the law as one that impeded
competition by favoring existing technologies over emerging technologies. 34 The CA was interpreted and regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC"). 3 5 Although the drafters of the CA sought
to build in flexibility for future growth in the telecommunications industry, the CA through the FCC was unable to keep up with pace of
innovation.

36

If the goal of the TCA was to remove barriers to entry into the market
for emerging technology, the TCA had to address land use regulation29. SeeJalloh, supra note 28, at 119 (discussing opposition to siting of PWS
facilities).
30. See id. (explaining conflicts with PWS facilities).
31. See Susan Lorde Martin, Communications Tower Sitings: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Battlefor Local Control, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 483, 486-88
(1997) (discussing citizen concems over PWS tower sitings).

Negative health effects caused by PWS towers are a major source of citizen
anger and fear at zoning board hearings. See id. The fear stems from a belief that
the electromagnetic fields created by the towers can cause cancer. See id. at 486.
32. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 5 (explaining how capacity and coverage
issues affect need for more towers). The demand for new towers is illustrated both
in the need for new towers to expand PWS coverage to areas that do not have the
service and the need for new towers to remedy so called "coverage gaps"-areas
where existing PWS capacity/infrastructure are inadequate to handle the increase

in volume. See id.
33. See Palermo, supra note 17, at 257 (commenting on balancing of concems).
34. See Heverly, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing shortcomings of Communications Act of 1934).
35. See 47 U.S.C. § 609 (1996) (creating FCC).
36. See David Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Height to Which Communities
Will Climb to Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CoP.. L. 469, 474-75 (1998)
(commenting on CA's regulatory shortcomings).
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the realm of local government. The drafters of the TCA recognized that
offering PWS technology to citizens presented a challenge similar to the
one faced during the advent of the wired telephone network nearly a century ago.3 7 Namely, PWS technology needs a corresponding infra38
structure.
Although Congress realized that they needed to preempt some local
government zoning regulation to carry out the TCA's PWS goals, they also
realized that they would have to do so gingerly. Because zoning was a
traditional local government power, and because the drafters-the new
Republican majority of the 104th Congress-embraced the ideals of the
"new federalism," the manner and degree of preemption was essential.3 9
Some members favored delegating the task to the FCC, evidenced by the
language in the original House bill. 40 Conversely, the final legislation
adopted by the conference committee did not delegate authority to the
FCC, but instead prescribed the parameters under which a local government could regulate the siting of PWS facilities. 4 1 The final legislation
recognized the needs of local government by retaining local decisionmak37. See Heverly, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining similarities between original
challenges faced by wired telephone technology and PWS technology).

38. See Tan, supra note 10, at 466 (stating that "the federal goals of the TCA
translate into a mandate for thousands of new antennas to emerge across the country, touching every community that the telecommunications industry serves").
39. See, e.g.,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 207-08 (1996) (commenting that
"the conference agreement creates a new section 704 [codified as 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c) (7) (1994 & Supp. 1997) which prevents Commission [FCC] preemption
of local and State land use decisions and preserves the authority of State and local
governments over zoning and land use matters except in limited circumstances set
forth in the conference agreement"). For an example of the new "federalism" that
dominated the Republican controlled 104th Congress, see generally REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA:

THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWr

REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO CHANGE THE
NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
40. See H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 107 (1995) (authorizing FCC to prescribe
national policy for siting of PWS facilities); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-204 (I), at 253
(1995) (explaining that PWS facility siting rules will be promulgated by FCC).
Under the House version, the FCC would create a negotiated rulemaking committee comprised of PWS industry players as well as representatives from state and
local government. See id. Based upon the recommendations of this committee,
the FCC would promulgate national PWS facility siting rules. See id. The proposal
was squarely defeated in the Committee because it completely removed siting issues from the control of local government-it simply took too much local control
away. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 207-08 (1996) (noting rejection of
House proposal); see also 142 CONG. REc. Hl144 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement
of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("I strongly opposed a provision included in the House
passed bill that would have allowed the Federal Communications Commission to
issue rules that would preempt local zoning on where to site towers in any location,
regardless of local concerns and the actions of local city councils and planning
commissions, provided that they had obtained approval from an FCC bureaucrat
in Washington.").
41. See H.R. CONy. REP. No. 104-458, at 207-08 (rejecting delegation to FCC).
Final legislation was entitled "Preservation of Local Zoning Authority" and it
blanketly claimed to preserve local authority, but effectively preempted some of
GINGRICH,
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ing control, yet it remained true to its stated goals by prescribing the de42
gree to which local governments could regulate.
2.

The Regulatory or De-regulatory Framework

As stated previously, section 332(c) (7)43 of the TCA provides a blanket statement expressly purporting to preserve local government control
that authority through exceptions to the general statement. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c) (7) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (preempting some local zoning authority).
42. See 142 CONG. REc. H1144 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte) (noting that final legislation "protects the rights of local governments
to see that their zoning regulations are carried forward in making sure that, when
new cell towers are located, they have the ability to determine ... where they are
placed while fairly making sure that those locations do not interfere with interstate
commerce and with the opportunity to advance this new technology"). Rep.
Goodlatte was a conference committee member. See H.R. CON. REP. No. 104-458,
at 212.

43. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7). This section provides:
(7) Preservation of local zoning authority
(A) General authority
Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter
shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government
or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.
(B) Limitations
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities by any State
or local government or instrumentality thereof(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers
of functionally equivalent services; and
(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting
the provision of personal wireless services.
(ii) A State or local government or instrumentality thereof
shall act on any request for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a
reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed
with such government or instrumentality, taking into account the nature and scope of such request.
(iii) Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing
and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.
(iv) No State or local government or instrumentality thereof
may regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of
the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to
the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations concerning such emissions.
(v) Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure
to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may,
within 30 days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.
The court shall hear and decide such action on an expe-
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over PWS facility siting decisions, subject only to the enumerated requirements.4 4 The statute imposes both substantive and procedural requirements on local governments. 45 There are three substantive requirements:
(1) that the regulation shall not "unreasonably discriminate" among providers of "functionally equivalent services"; (2) that the regulation shall not
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting wireless service; and (3) that the
local government cannot regulate on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions if those facilities comply with relevant
FCC regulations. 46 These three substantive requirements limit the basis
47
on which a local government can decide PWS siting issues.
In addition to the three substantive requirements of section
332(c) (7), there are two procedural requirements: (1) that a local governdited basis. Any person adversely affected by an act or failure to act by a State or local government or any
instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with clause (iv)
may petition the Commission for relief.
(C) Definitions
For purposes of this paragraph(i) the term "personal wireless services" means commercial
mobile services, unlicenced wireless services, and common
carrier wireless exchange access services;
(ii) the term "personal wireless service facilities" means facilities for the provision of personal wireless services; and
(iii) the term "unlicenced wireless service" means the offering
of telecommunications services using duly authorized devices which do not require individual licenses, but does
not mean the provision of direct-to-home satellite services
(as defined in section 303(v) of this title).
Id.
44. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (preserving local government zoning authority
subject to certain limitations); see also Heverly, supra note 4, at 4-5 (explaining
structure of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)).
45. See Heverly, supra note 4, at 4-5 (describing regulatory framework of 47
U.S.C. § 332(c) (7)).
46. 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c) (7) (B) (i) & (iv) (imposing substantive requirements).
The conference report explains the purposes and scope of these substantive requirements. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208.
Concerning section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (I), the conferees stated that "functionally
equivalent services" refers "only to personal wireless services ... that directly compete against one another." Id. Conferees intended that this language would prevent a local government from unreasonably favoring one PWS competitor over
another. Additionally, they stated that the language "unreasonably discriminate"
provides flexibility for the local governments to "treat facilities that create different
visual, aesthetic, or safety concerns differently to the extent permitted under generally applicable zoning requirements even if those facilities provide functionally
equivalent services." Id. The language is "unreasonably discriminate," not simply
"discriminate."
The conferees explained that section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) is intended to ensure that local regulation, either expressly or through practice, does not prevent
the provision of wireless service in a given area. See id. Further, it was their intent
that PWS facility siting issues be made on a case-by-case basis. See id.
47. See Heverly, supra note 4, at 5 (explaining effect of substantive
requirements).
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ment act on a PWS facility siting application within a reasonable period of
and supported
time; and (2) that PWS siting decision denials be in writing
48
by substantial evidence contained in a written record.
Last, section 332(c) (7) provides for expedited review of denials of
PWS zoning permits to either the federal or state courts-and not to the
slow moving

FCC.

49

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

JudicialInterpretationof the Breadth TCA's Preemption

To say that there has been voluminous litigation concerning the
scope and degree of federal preemption under section 332(c) (7) would
be an understatement. The speed and level of litigation has been attributable to the statute's expedited judicial review provision. 50 This section
will review how the federal courts have been interpreting section
332(c) (7). The goal is to determine the level of federal preemption and
simultaneously illustrate the parameters of legitimate local governmental
regulation of PWS facility siting. Specifically, this section will analyze how
courts have interpreted two of the three substantive requirements and the
51
two procedural requirements mandated by the TCA.
1.

UnreasonableDiscriminationAmong Providers of Functionally
Equivalent Services

The section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (I) substantive requirement prohibiting
unreasonable discrimination among providers of functionally equivalent
services prevents local governments from favoring existing technologies
48. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c) (7) (B)(ii)-(iii) (1994 & Supp. 1997). The conference report states that the "reasonable period of time" language of section
332(c) (7) (B) (ii) is not intended to give special treatment to PWS facility siting
requests. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208. Further, the report explains
that the language "substantial evidence contained in a written record" means the
traditional standard used for judicial review of administrative agency actions. Id.
49. See 47 U.S.C. § 332 (c) (7) (B) (v) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (providing expedited judicial review of local government PWS siting decisions with federal and
state courts).

50. See id. (providing expedited judicial review). This provision provides that
review of local government decisions should not be obtained at the FCC in Washington, D.C., but instead expedited review should be obtained judicially from local
federal and state courts. See id. Section 332(c) (7) (B) (v) is seen as a victory for
local governments because of the belief that the local courts provide a more neutral forum than the FCC. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ET AL., supranote 22, at 7

("State and federal courts provide a more neutral and much less costly arena for
parties to resolve disputes than the FCC, where industry attorneys have a decided
financial and practical advantage over city and county attorneys.").
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (providing for review by FCC when local
government makes PWS siting decision on basis of health or environmental effects
of radio frequency emissions). This is the only basis for which an adversely effected party can appeal to the FCC. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ET AL., supra
note 22, at 7.
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and PWS providers over emerging technologies and new PWS providers.5 2
The courts have explained that section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (I) does not preempt all local government discrimination among competing PWS providers, but rather it only preempts unreasonable discrimination. 5 3 Further,
reviewing courts have opined that the test for reasonableness is whether
the local governmental body had a legitimate basis for their
54
discrimination.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was the
first federal appellate court to review an action under section 332(c) (7).
In AT&T Wireless PCS v. City Council of Virginia Beach,55 the Fourth Circuit

found that the defendant city council did not violate the proscription
against unreasonable discrimination and granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. 56 In the case, the plaintiffs applied for a conditional use permit to erect two 135-foot PCS towers in a wooded residential
district. 57 Four different PWS providers-two PCS and two cellular-were
to be collocated on the two PWS towers. 58 The Fourth Circuit stated that
discrimination among competing PWS providers was virtually impossible
because the defendant rejected the application for a conditional use permit that affected all four providers equally. 59 Although the court noted
that no discrimination was possible, the court went on to hold that even if
52. See Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47, 51-52 (D.
Mass. 1997) (commenting that purpose of requirement is to prevent existing providers from being sheltered from competition).
53. See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d
423, 427 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating "the obvious point that the Act explicitly contemplates that some discrimination ... is allowed."); Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment of Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F. Supp. 2d 359, 373 (D.N.J. 1998) (opining that it is
not enough for courts to discern discrimination; they must discern unreasonable
discrimination); Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n of Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185-86 (D. Conn. 1998) (same); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v.
Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1468 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (stating that it is not
enough for plaintiffs to show unequal treatment).
54. See Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. at 1467-68 (stating that "[a] n inquiry into
the reasonableness of governmental action focuses on whether a 'legitimate basis'
for the contested action is presented."); see also Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 374
(holding that there is no unreasonable action if zoning authority has legitimate
basis for its decision).

For a basis to be legitimate, the basis must be legitimate under both the state
zoning law and TCA. See id. (finding legitimate basis where defendant applied
legal standards prescribed in relevant zoning enabling law); Town of Easton, 982 F.
Supp. at 51 (holding defendant zoning board illegally relied on bases proscribed
by TCA and applicable zoning requirements).
55. 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
56. See id. at 427 (finding no unreasonable discrimination).
57. See id. at 424.
58. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 7 (defining collocation as: "the placement of
more than one carrier's antenna array upon a single monopole, tower, building, or
structure."); see also City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 427.
59. See City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 427 (characterizing plaintiffs'
allegation as "dubious at best").
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discrimination was present, it was reasonable. 60 The court noted that the
city council members weighed the need for the new towers against constituent concerns that arose during the permit hearings. 61 Most significantly,
the court said it was not unreasonable for the defendant to cite the sufficient quality of existing analog wireless service as a basis for the permit
62
denial so long as there was a weighing of concerns.
Similarly, in Cellular Telephone Co. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Ho-

Ho-Kus, 63 the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
found no unreasonable discrimination and granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment.6 4 The court held that there was no evidence that
the decision favored one carrier over the other. 65 Citing the Fourth Circuit's rationale in City Council of Virginia Beach, the court opined that there

could be no discrimination in denying variances for a tower in which three
PWS competitors sought to collocate. 66 Further, the court, applying the
legal standards set forth in the state zoning enabling legislation, noted
that if there was discrimination, it was not unreasonable because the zon67
ing board had a legitimate basis for denying the variances.
Conversely, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held in Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton68 that defendant

zoning board of appeals unreasonably discriminated among PWS providers when it denied a special permit for a PCS provider in an area where
cellular service was provided. 69 Although other courts have found no unreasonable discrimination where zoning boards have chosen existing PWS
providers over new providers, in all those situations the respective governmental entities had a legitimate zoning basis for their decision. 70 The
court in Town of Easton found no such legitimate basis-only general citi-

60. See id. (commenting that even if defendant discriminate it did not do so
unreasonably, "under any possible interpretation").
61. See id. (noting that defendant balanced competing needs and concerns).
62. See id. at 428 (stating that it was legitimate for defendant to consider quality of existing analog PWS service).
63. 24 F. Supp. 2d 359 (D.NJ. 1998).
64. See id. at 374.

65. See id. (finding no evidence that defendant favored one PWS provider
over another).
66. See id. (writing that denial of variances equally affected all three PWS providers) (citing City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 426).

67. See id. (opining that any possible discrimination was reasonable because
defendant demonstrated legitimate basis to discriminate).
68. 982 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1997).
69. See id. at 51-52.
70. See City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 428 (explaining that city coun-

cil appropriately applied applicable legal standards in their decisionmaking process); Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (finding zoning board's decision to be
"unquestionably legitimate" in light application of applicable legal standards).
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zen complaints. 7 1 The court then issued an affirmative injunction order72
ing the zoning board to grant the special permit.

2.

Prohibitions on the Provision of PersonalWireless Service

The underlying purpose of the section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) substantive requirement against local prohibitions and de facto prohibitions on
the provision of wireless service is to enable the telecommunications industry to create a national PWS infrastructure. Currently, there is a split of
authority in interpreting this substantive requirement. Some courts have
interpreted this requirement as only disallowing blanket bans or policies
that have the effect of prohibiting wireless service. 73 Under this narrow
interpretation, individual zoning decisions are exempt from judicial scru71. See Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. at 51 (concluding that "[bly deciding as it
did, the Board favors existing [PWS] providers, sheltering them from the very competition Congress sought to create when it enacted TCA").
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama found
that vague assertions of the public interest, without supporting evidence, is an illegitimate basis. See Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457,
1468 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (finding no legitimate basis).
Similarly, because defendant zoning authority did not have an of-the-record
legitimate basis, the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
held the defendant unreasonably discriminated. See Western PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Auth. of Santa Fe, 957 F. Supp. 1230, 1237-38 (D.N.M. 1997).

Defendant sought to place a PCS tower on top of an existing water tower to provide service along the 1-25 corridor. See id. at 1237. The denial of the special ex-

ception benefitted existing analog providers. See id. at 1237-38. Lack of a
legitimate basis for the "discrimination" made the discrimination "unreasonable."
See id. at 1238.
72. See Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. at 53. Because section 332(c) (7) (B) (v)
provides for expedited review of PWS siting decisions, reviewing courts uniformly
have declined to remand their decisions to the relevant local governmental entities. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also Abrams, supra
note 26, at 4 (stating that § 332(c) (7) (B) (v) authorizes reviewing courts to grant
mandamus relief); see, e.g., Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n
of Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d. 178 (D. Conn. 1998) (granting affirmative injunction to prevent further delay); Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Pine
Grove Township, No. CIV.A.97-7088, 1998 WL 634909, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16,
1998) (same); Virginia Metronet, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of James City
County, 984 F. Supp. 966, 977 (E.D. Va. 1998) (ordering defendant to issue special
use permit); Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. at 1469 (granting writ of mandamus);
Illinois RSA No. 3, Inc. v. County of Peoria, 963 F. Supp. 732, 747 (C.D. Ill. 1997)
(ordering issuance of special use permit); ExtraterritorialZoning Auth. of Santa Fe,
957 F. Supp. at 1240 (granting writ of mandamus); BellSouth Mobility Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 944 F. Supp. 923, 929 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (same). Instead the federal
courts have favored injunctive and mandamus relief because these are more in line
with the spirit of expedited review. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 4 (commenting
that remanding back to zoning boards would frustrate purposes of TCA); see also
Gwinnett County, 944 F. Supp. at 929 (recognizing Congressional intent to expedite
reviews and remedies) (citing H.R. CON. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996)).
73. See, e.g., City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 420 (explaining requirement applies to blanket bans and policies).
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tiny.7 4 Conversely, other courts read the requirement broadly also to encompass facially neutral policies that necessarily result in the denial of any
75
or all PWS tower applications.
The Fourth Circuit, in City Council of Virginia Beach,76 read the limitation narrowly, applying only to blanket bans or policies and not to individual decisions. 77 In finding for the defendant zoning board, the court
expressly rejected plaintiff's case-by-case approach to section
332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II), noting that a case-by-case approach was only provided
for in section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (I).78
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held

in Cellco Partnership v. Zoning Commission of Farmington79 that section
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) violations are evidenced by general biases against
granting zoning permits for PWS providers who propose facilities similar
to that of the current applicant.8 0 In Cellco Partnership, the plaintiff applied to the town for a special use permit to construct cellular antennas
within a church steeple. 8 1 The court found for the defendant because
74. See generally Celco Partnership, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (explaining that
§ 332(c) (7) (I) (II) does not apply to individual zoning decisions).
75. See, e.g., Virginia Metronet, 984 F. Supp. at 971 (opining that
§ 332(c) (7) (B) (I) (II) also applies to facially neutral policies and regulations).
76. For a discussion of facts of this case, see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
77. See City Council of Viginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 428 (reading limitation to
cover only blanket bans or policies that effectuate bans); see also Cellular Tel. Co. v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F. Supp. 2d 359, 374 (D.N.J. 1998)
(describing Fourth Circuit's decision in City Council of Virginia Beach as the "strictest
interpretation of this provision to date"). In Ho-Ho-Kus, the court found for the
defendant zoning board under both the narrow and the broad interpretation. See
id. at 375 (holding zoning board did not prohibit provision of PWS under either
interpretation).
78. See City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 429 (rejecting plaintiff's caseby-case proposed interpretation). The court opined a case-by-case approach to
section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) would "effectively nullify local authority by mandating
approval of all (or nearly all) applications . . . ." Id. at 428. The court reasoned
that such an interpretation would be contrary to section 332(c) (7) (B) (iii), which
implies that local governments retain the authority to deny tower siting applications. See id. (reconciling § 332(c) (7) (B) (I) (II) with § 332(c) (7) (B) (iii)). Additionally, the court stated that this interpretation would not, as plaintiff's counsel
argued, render section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) meaningless because moratoria would
still undergo judicial scrutiny. See id. (noting application of § 332(c) (7) (B) (I) (II)
in several moratoria cases). For a discussion of moratoria cases, see infra notes 97113 and accompanying text.
Further, the Fourth Circuit noted that its narrow construction of section
332 (c) (7) (B) (I) (II) "simultaneously furthers the Act's explicit goals of facilitating
competition, by strengthening the hand of new market entrants who cannot show
that they have been unreasonably discriminated against, and of preserving a large
portion of local authority by maintaining that authority in particular cases." Id.
79. 3 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D. Conn. 1998).
80. See id. (holding no § 332(c) (7) (B) (I) (II) violation because plaintiff did
not offer any evidence of defendant's general bias against granting permits for
PWS facilities that are similar to plaintiffs proposal).
81. See id.at 181.
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there was no general bias against granting such permits. 82 Any allegation

of bias was dubious in light of the defendant's grant of plaintiff's similar
83

applications in the past.
Conversely, in Western PCS I Corp. v. ExtraterritorialZoning Authority of
Santa Fe,84 the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico

adopted a broad interpretation of the provision. 85 In ExtraterritorialZoning
Authority of Santa Fe, the court held that the defendant zoning authority
effectuated a prohibition when they denied plaintiffs special exception
application.8 6 In order to provide PCS service to the narrow 1-25 corridor,
plaintiff wanted to construct a tower atop an existing water tower. 87 Key to
the court's holding was the extremely small amount of siting location options.8 8 Thus, by denying plaintiffs application, the zoning authority ef89
fectively prohibited the introduction of PCS service into the region.
The real significance of ExtraterritorialZoning Authority of Santa Fe is the

court's finding that there was a prohibition on the provision of wireless
service in an area that already had wireless service-cellular service. 90
Thus, the court held that a prohibition on the provision of PCS service
alone was a prohibition on the provision of PWS in general. 9 1
1.

Local Government Action Within a Reasonable Time

Section 332(c) (7) (B) (ii) mandates that local governments process applications and decide PWS facility siting matters within a reasonable
amount of time. 92 The purpose of this requirement is to facilitate a rapid
and orderly creation of a national PWS infrastructure. 93 The provision
does not require the local government to act within a finite amount of
82. See id. at 184.

83. See id. (stating that defendant approved similar PWS-related application
for plaintiff).
84. 957 F. Supp. 1230 (D.N.M. 1997).
85. See id. at 1238 (adopting broad interpretation of § 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II)).
86. See id. (opining that denial of special exception effectuated prohibition).
87. See id. at 1234.
88. See id. at 1237-38 (noting extremely small amount of siting location options as factor in holding).
89. See id. at 1238 (citing effective denial of PCS service).
90. See id. (noting existing cellular service in 1-25 corridor).
91. See id. (opining that PCS technology is more advanced than cellular technology, therefore, denial of special exception effectively denies provision of this
new technology and its advantages).
92. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (mandating that
applications be processed and decided with reasonable time).
93. See Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1467-68
(N.D. Ala. 1997) (discussing purpose of § 332(c) (7) (B) (ii) (1994 & Supp. 1997):
"By such language, 'Congress has tried to stop local authorities from keeping wireless providers tied up in the hearing process.'") (quoting Westel-Milwaukee Co., Inc.
v. Walworth County, 556 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Wis. 1996)).
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time. 94 The reasonableness requirement takes into account the nature
and scope of the PWS applicant's request. 95 Although the provision's purpose is to expedite local governmental action, it does not mandate that
96
PWS facility related applications get special treatment.

Litigation under section 332(c) (7) (B) (ii) has arisen generally under
two types of circumstances. The first is when local governmental entities
have initiated moratoria on the granting of PWS facility siting permits or
the processing of applications altogether. 9 7 Courts have tended to uphold
moratoria on the granting of new permits, so long as the entity still accepted and processed applications. 9 8 On the other hand, courts have

been hostile to moratoria on the application process itself.9 9 The other
area in which section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) litigation has arisen is when the
local entity simply takes too much time to grant or to deny the PWS provider's application. 10 0 In this situation, courts, following the provision's
mandate, have applied a reasonable under the circumstances
approach. 10 1

94. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) (ii) (designating no specific time period for
action on PWS siting decisions).

95. See id. (providing that processing governmental entity take "into account
the nature and scope of such request"); see also NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ET AL.,
supra note 22, at 6 (commenting that reasonableness is measured in light of nature

of request).
96. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ET AL., supra note 22, at 6 (noting that
applicable local governmental entity is not required to provide preferential
treatment).
97. See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Farmington, No. 3.97 CV863
(GLG), 1997 WL 631104, at *6 (D. Conn. Oct. 6, 1997) (involving moratoria that
prevented PWS facility siting applications altogether); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City
of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (involving moratorium on
issuance of special use permits for siting of PWS facilities).
98. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 4-5 (commenting on validity of moratoria
that only prevent issuance of permits for short period of time); see, e.g., City of
Medina, 924 F. Supp. at 1040 (upholding moratorium on issuance of permits).
99. See Abrams, supranote 26, at 4-5 (commenting on judicial hostility to long
moratoria that bar application altogether); see, e.g., Town of Farmington, 1997 WL
631104, at *6 (declaring moratoria violative of § 332(c) (7) (B) (ii)).
100. See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Ho-Ho-Kus, 24
F. Supp. 2d 359, 364 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that two and one half years was not
unreasonable under circumstances); Illinois RSA No. 3, Inc. v. County of Peoria,
963 F. Supp. 732, 745 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that six months was not unreasonable under § 332(c) (7) (B) (ii)).
101. See Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 364 (reasoning that "[t]he amount of
time which elapsed while plaintiffs' application was pending is not dispositive as to
whether there was unreasonable delay because 'each situation must be independently examined.'") (quoting Virginia Metronet, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors ofJames
City County, 984 F. Supp. 966, 977 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
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Moratoria

In Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina,10 2 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington upheld a six-month moratorium on the issuance of permits for PWS facilities. 10 3 Five days after the
enactment of the TCA, the defendant city adopted a moratorium to allow
10 4
the city time to update its regulations to conform with the new law.
The court upheld the moratorium as very reasonable under the
circumstances.

10 5

In contrast, in Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Farmington,10 6 the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that a nine-month
moratorium that barred PWS providers from even applying for a zoning
application was violative of section 332(c) (7) (B) (ii).10 7 The court distinguished the moratorium in this case with the moratorium in City of Medina.10 8 Unlike the moratorium in City of Medina, the Farmington
moratorium not only barred issuance of permits, but also barred applications and the processing thereof.10 9 Further, the court noted that Farmington passed its moratorium sixteen months after enactment of the TCA,
not five days, and almost nine months after the plaintiffs first zoning application. 1 10 Similarly, in Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County,11 ' the
United States District Court for the Northen District of Alabama invalidated a moratorium that prevented the processing of applications. 1 1 2 The
court reasoned that the local government failed to act on the applications
within a reasonable period of time.

13

102. 924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
103. See id. at 1040 (upholding moratorium).
104. See id. at 1037-38 (noting resolution suspends issuing of permits but not
processing of permits). The city anticipated a considerable increase in PWS facility
siting applications and the city felt that it needed time to prepare. See id.
105. See id. at 1039. The court explained that the moratorium
is not a prohibition on wireless facilities, nor does it have a prohibitory
effect. It is, rather, a short-term suspension of permit-issuing while the
City gathers information and processes applications. Nothing in the record suggests that this is other than a necessary and bona fide effort to act
carefully in a field with rapidly evolving technology. Nothing in the moratorium would prevent Sprint's application, or anyone else's, from being
granted.
Id.
106. No. 3.97 CV863 (GLG), 1997 WL 631104 (D. Conn. Oct. 6, 1997).
107. See id. at *5-6 (striking down nine month moratorium barring
applications).
108. See id. at *6 (distinguishing moratorium in City of Medina).
109. See id.
110. See id. (comparing moratorium passage dates).
111. 968 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
112. See id. at 1468 (invalidating moratorium under 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c) (7) (B) (ii) (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
113. See id. (opining that defendant "has not kept plaintiffs 'tied up in the
hearing process': it has excluded them from the process altogether").
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Duration of Decisionmaking Period
In Illinois RSA No. 3, Inc. v. County of Peoria,1 14 the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Central District of Illinois held that six months was not
an unreasonable period of time for deciding whether to issue a special use
permit to the plaintiff PWS provider.' 15 The court noted that the defendant began working on the application immediately and that the defendant
did not object to several continuances. 1 1 6 Although the plaintiff offered
evidence that the usual duration of zoning procedures was two to three
1 7
months, the court opined that six months is not per se unreasonable.'
Comparatively, the court in Ho-Ho-Kus ruled that a much longer period-two and one half years-was a reasonable period of time for section
332(c) (7) (B) (ii) purposes. 1 8 Over the two and one half year period, the
defendant held forty-five public hearings. 119 The hearings were conducted in a quasi-judicial format employing rules of evidence. 120 Further,
the court noted that the plaintiffs offered the majority of testimony at the
hearings.12 1 And, as in County of Peoria,the plaintiffs never objected to any
of the continuances or complained that the length of the process violated
22
section 332(c) (7) (B) (ii).1
4.

Denials in Writing and Supported by SubstantialEvidence in a Written
Record

Section 332(c) (7) (B) (iii) provides that any decision by a local government to deny an application for a PWS facility siting "shall be in writing
114. 963 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
115. See id. at 745-46 (holding six-month time period reasonable).
116. See id. (discussing "usual durations" of zoning procedures and reasonableness of lengths of time).
117. See id. (finding length of time did not violate § 332(c) (7) (B) (ii)). Important to the court's ruling of reasonableness was the plaintiffs generally permis-

sive approach to the scheduling of the necessary hearings as well as the plaintiff's
failure to object to several continuances. See id. (listing factors considered in its
decision).
118. See Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 359, 365 (D.NJ. 1998) (finding that time period was reasonable under

circumstances).
119. See id. at 363-64 (noting Board's action regarding plaintiffs application).

120. See id. at 365 (noting that defendant provided fair public forum for application). The defendant zoning. board allowed for presentation of witnesses, cross

examination and made reasonable accommodations for both parties when witnesses were unavailable. See id. Further, the zoning board limited public questioning to relevant issues. See id. at 364-65.
121. See id. at 364-65 (stating that majority of testimony was offered by

plaintiffs).
122. See id. at 364 (noting that plaintiffs failed to complain about extensions
of time and never suggested extended duration was "violative of TCA"). The court
also stated that the zoning board made special accommodations for the applica-

tion by expanding the number of monthly meetings from one to four during the
final deliberative
accommodate).

months.

See

id.

(explaining

defendant's
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1 23
and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.
Currently, there is a stark split of authority on the interpretation of this
provision. 124 Because the Conference Report explains that "substantial evidence in a written record" refers to the traditional judicial review standard of administrative agencies, some courts have construed all of section
332(c) (7)(B)(iii) to be in conformity with traditional principles of federal
administrative law. 125 These courts require local governments to issue formal decisions explaining the reasons for their decisions and linking their
conclusions to evidence in the record.1 26 Other courts take a different
approach. Some courts interpret section 332(c) (7) (B) (iii) as simply requiring that: (1) the local government notify the applicant of the denial in
writing; and (2) that the local government's decision be supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. 127 These courts do not
require that the written notice of denial includes reasons for the decision
and references to the written record. Beyond the issue of the character of
the written denial, directed by the Conference Report, some courts have
looked to federal law for a definition of substantial evidence and then to
state zoning law to determine the weight of that evidence. 128 Although

123. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) (iii) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (requiring decision
to be in writing and supported by substantial record evidence).
124. Compare Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of North Stonington, 12 F. Supp.
2d 247, 251 (D. Conn. 1998) (requiring written decision containing its reasons and
links to supporting evidence in written record), with AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v.

City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 1998) (requiring that
denial simply be in writing).
125. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-204, at 208 (1996) (stating, "[t]he phrase
'substantial evidence contained in a written record' is the traditional standard used
for judicial review of agency actions"); see also Illinois RSA No. 3, Inc. v. County of
Peoria, 963 F. Supp. 732, 743 (C.D. Ill.
1997) (citing H.R. CON. REP. No. 104-204,
at 208 in construing requirements of § 332(c) (7) (B) (iii)).
126. See, e.g., Primco Personal Communications, L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake,
26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that Congress prescribed application of federal principles of administrative law); Town of North Stonington, 12 F.
Supp. 2d at 251 (requiring decision similar to that of traditional federal administrative law); County of Peoria, 963 F. Supp. at 743 (discussing federal administrative
law and noting lack of written statement in record giving reasons for court's decision); Western PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Auth. of Santa Fe, 957 F.
Supp. 1230, 1236 (D.N.M. 1997) (analyzing federal requirement for written denial
and rational behind it).
127. See City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 429 (interpreting
§ 332(c) (7) (B) (iii) narrowly); Gearon & Co. v. Fulton County, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1351,
1354 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (applying narrow interpretation to statute).
128. See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Ho-Ho-Kus, 24
F. Supp. 2d 359, 365-67 (D.N.J. 1998) (looking to federal administrative law for
definition of substantial evidence, but looking to state zoning law to find standards
to weigh evidence). The Ho-Ho-Kus court determined that substantial evidence in
the context of federal administrative law means, "more than a mere scintilla, but
may be less than a preponderance." Id. at 366 (quoting Alexander v. Shalala, 927 F.
Supp. 785, 791 (D.N.J. 1995)). Additionally, the court looked to NewJersey zoning law as the standard to determine whether the weight of the evidence was substantial. See id. In this case, the plaintiffs argued that the court should not look to
state law because TCA preempted state authority in the area of PWS facility siting.
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these courts state that section 332(c) (7) (B) (iii) still requires reviewing
courts to apply substantive standards of applicable state and local zoning
129
Other
law, they have applied a more rigorous review to permit denials.
courts have expressly rejected the application of federal administrative
law's interpretation of substantial evidence. 13 0
In County of Peoria, the United States District Court for the Central
District of Illinois held that the defendant county violated section
332(c) (7) (B) (iii) by memorializing its decision in a simple written denial.13 1 The court found the defendant's written denial insufficient because it did not explain the county's reasons for the decision and did not
refer to any evidence in the record. 132 The court opined that these were
13 3
It reasoned that a
critical elements under the TCA's statutory scheme.
detailed written decision of denial is needed to allow for effective and effi1 34
cient judicial review.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 13 5 applied federal principles
136
The Second Cirof administrative law to define substantial evidence.
cuit reviewed two denials of special use permit applications to erect analog
See id. The court responded and stated that TCA expressly preserved state authority. See id. The court reasoned, "the requirement of the TCA that a denial by a
state or local government... be in writing and based upon substantial evidence
'does not affect or encroach upon the substantive standards to be applied under
established principles of state and local law.'" Id. (citing AT&T Wireless Services of
Florida, Inc. v. Orange County, 994 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (M.D. Fla. 1997)).
129. See Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.
1999) (opining that traditional, deferential review of local zoning decisions is not
applicable to review under TCA).
130. See, e.g., City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 429 (rejecting application of federal administrative law principles).
131. See County of Peoria, 963 F. Supp. at 743 (ruling defendant violated
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)). The defendant presented the plaintiff with the following
written denial:
On June 11, 1996, the Peoria County Board DENIED your request for a
Special Use for a utility communication tower in the R1 Zoning District.
You have the right to appeal this decision. You must file your appeal with
the Peoria Circuit Clerk's Office. Please contact your attorney if you have
questions about this letter.
Thank You for your cooperation.
Id.
132. See id. (noting statutory deficiencies of written denial).
133. See id. (noting reasons for violation).
134. See id. (explaining rationale behind need for written decision containing
reasons and .links to evidence in record).
135. 166 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 1999).
136. See id. (opining that "substantial evidence, in the usual context, has been
construed to mean less than a preponderance, but more than a scintilla of evidence. 'It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'") (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (defining language "substantial evidence" as used in Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994))).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 7

800

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44: p. 781

cellular towers on top of two existing water towers.13 7 The defendant
town held a hearing for each special use permit application. 13 8 At the
hearings, the applicants presented evidence of the need for the two towers
to remedy a coverage gap and evidence that the towers would not alter the
character of the town. 139 The defendant town, however, presented no evidence supporting the denial of the special use permit, and citizen protestants voiced only isolated concerns about the perceived health effects of
the towers. 140 Despite that there were only occasional remarks from a citizen protestant about property values and aesthetics, the town denied the
special use permits because of these citizen concerns.14 1 The Second Circuit held that the town's denials violated section 332(c) (7) (B) (iii) because
the record did not contain substantial evidence as defined under princi14 2
ples of federal administrative law.
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit held in City Council of Virginia Beach

that the defendant city council's decision did not violate section
332(c) (7) (B) (iii) when it failed to provide a written decision containing
its reasons for denial along with links to the written record. 143 The city
council's decision was recorded in a two page summary of the minutesdescribing the application, listing the names and views of all who testified
at the hearing and recording the votes of each councilperson-and in a
letter from the planning commission to the city council describing the
application and stamped with the word "denied" and the date of the city
council's vote. 144 The court reasoned that either one of these writings
14 5
would satisfy the section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) "in writing" requirement.
The court chastised the lower court for interpreting section
332(c) (7) (B) (iii) in the same manner as the Central District of Illinois in
County of Peoria.146 The Fourth Circuit explained that the provision really
contains two separate requirements and courts, such as the court in County
137. See id. at 492 (describing defendant's denials of special use permits).
138. See id. (outlining process for obtaining special permits with presentation
of witnesses and scientific evidence).
139. See id. (discussing evidence presented by AT&T in support of obtaining
special permit). For a discussion of coverage gaps, see supra notes 28 & 32 and
accompanying text.
140. See Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d at 492 (stating that statutorily impermissible evidence of perceived health concerning dominated both hearings).
141. See id. (noting that town's denial rested on issues of aesthetics, environmental impact, air and noise quality and traffic and parking concerns).
142. See id. at 495-97 (invalidating town's special use permit denials).
143. See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d
423, 429 (4th Cir. 1998) (ruling that defendant was in compliance with
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
144. See id. (noting city council's denial of application was consistent with its
usual practice and it provided no written explanation for denial).
145. See id. (holding defendant satisfied § 332(c) (7) (B) (iii)).
146. See id. (explaining that lower court misconstrued provision).
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of Peoria,have combined the two requirements improperly. 147 The Fourth
Circuit held that "in writing" is a completely separate requirement from
"substantial evidence in a written record."1 48 Further, the Fourth Circuit
dismissed any concerns that a reviewing court needs a more substantive
denial. 149 It reasoned that the separate substantial evidence requirement
provides ample information to allow for effective and efficient judicial
50
review.1
B.

Competing Views of CongressionalIntent in Interpretation of TCA 's
Preemption Provisions

Competing interpretations of congressional intent underlie the federal courts' decisions on the TCA's preemption provisions. Did Congress
intend sweeping preemption of local government control over the siting
of PWS facilities, or did they want no more preemption than necessary in
order to implement the goals of the TCA? The difference ofjudicial opinion on this question is most evident in the substantive requirement against
the prohibition of PWS services in section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) and in the
definition of substantial evidence as used in section 332(c) (7) (B) (iii). A
court's particular interpretation of Congressional intent is determinative
of the outcome on cases decided under these particular provisions. This
Comment argues that Congress intended a more limited preemption of
local control as illustrated by the Fourth Circuit's decision in City Council of
Virginia Beach.
1. An Illustration of the Two Views of CongressionalIntent
Emblematic of courts that have interpreted the preemption provisions broadly, the District of New Mexico in ExtraterritorialZoning Authority
147. See id. The court noted that the lower court combined these two requirements because the court read too much into the Conference Report's statement
that substantial evidence was to be defined in the context of federal administrative
law. See id. Simply put, the Fourth Circuit criticized the lower court for applying
federal administrative law to the "in writing" requirement as well. See id. The
Fourth Circuit noted that the lower court's requirement that all decisions be in
writing, as well as contain rationales and links to evidence in the record, is the
federal standard for judicial review of administrative adjudication and formal rule
making. See id.; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1994)
(providing procedural requirements for formal rulemaking and adjudication).
The Fourth Circuit opined that if Congress wanted a more involved written decision, it would have required such a statement, as it did in other sections of the
TCA. See City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 429 (stating that other sections
of TCA contain similarly explicit language); see also 47 U.S.C § 252(e) (1) (1994 &
Supp. 1997) (requiring "written findings as to any deficiencies" of certain agreements); 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (requiring FCC to "state the
basis for its approval or denial" of certain applications).
148. See City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 429 (separating
requirements).
149. See id. (rejecting "alleged necessity for judicial review" purposes).
150. See id. (ruling substantial evidence requirement provides for judicial
review).
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of Santa Fe applied section 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) against a prohibition of
PWS services to an individual zoning permit decision. 1 51 Although the
municipality already had personal wireless services, the court held that the
zoning authority's denial had the effect of prohibiting personal wireless
services. 152 Rationalizing its opinion, the court cited the TCA's goal of
increasing competition by removing barriers to entry, however, the court
did not cite the need to preserve local control. Underlying the court's
decision was the belief that Congress intended to broadly preempt local
zoning control, while only leaving nominal decisionmaking power.
Taking a distinctively different and more persuasive approach, the
Fourth Circuit in City Council of Virginia Beach held that section
332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II)'s requirement against prohibitions on the provision
of personal wireless services only preempted blanket bans or policies that
have the effect of prohibiting wireless service.' 5 3 Instead of addressing an
individual zoning permit decision, the Fourth Circuit opined that section
332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) addresses the larger regulatory framework or policy
thereof.1 54 The Fourth Circuit criticized courts that apply section
332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) to individual zoning permit decisions, arguing that individual decisions are already substantively scrutinized by the prohibition
on unreasonable discrimination between functionally equivalent services
contained in section 332(c)(7)(i)(I). 155 The Fourth Circuit correctly
opined that these courts misread the statutory framework of the preemp156
tion provisions.
The Fourth Circuit's rationale hinged on three points. First, applying
section 332(c) (7) (i) (II) together with section 332(c) (7) (i) (I) to individual zoning permit decisions would make it almost impossible for a local
zoning board to properly deny an application.' 57 The court noted that
the very existence of section 332(c) (7) (B) (iii), which prescribes proce151. For a discussion of the District of New Mexico's decision in Extraterritorial
Zoning Auth. of Santa Fe, see supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.

152. See Western PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Auth. of Santa Fe, 957
F. Supp. 1230, 1238 (D.N.M. 1997) (holding that denial of permit to erect PCS
tower by municipality that already had cellular service still violated
§ 332(c) (7)(B)(i) (II) (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
153. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's decision in City Council of Virginia
Beach, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
154. See ExtraterritorialZoning Authority of Santa Fe, 957 F. Supp. at 1238 (opining that §332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) did not address individual zoning decisions).
155. See City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 429 (chiding courts that
apply § 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) to individual zoning permit decisions).
156. See id. (disagreeing with courts applying § 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II) to individual zoning applications).
157. See id. at 428 (opining that "any reading of subsection (B) (i) (I)
[§ 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II)] that allows the subsection to apply to individual decisions
would effectively nullify local authority by mandating approval of all (or nearly all)
applications, a result contrary to the explicit language of section (B)(iii)
[§ 332(c) (7) (B) (iii)], which manifestly contemplates the ability of local authorities
to 'deny a request'").
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dural requirements for denials, illustrates that Congress intended local
governments to retain the power to deny a permit. 158 Second, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that its more narrow interpretation of the statute has already proved effective in striking down moratoria.159 Third, the court believed that their interpretation strikes a balance between the two
competing goals of section 332(c) (7)-facilitating competition by removing unreasonable barriers to entry and preserving a large portion of local
60
control in particular zoning decisions.'
The other area where a court's particular view of congressional intent
governs the outcome is in the definition of substantial evidence as used in
section 332(c) (7) (B) (iii). In Town of Oyster Bay, the Second Circuit's application of federal administrative law principles in defining substantial
evidence is based upon one sentence in the Conference Report.' 6 ' The
Conference Report comments that, "[t]he phrase 'substantial evidence
contained in a written record' is the traditional standard used for judicial
review of agency decisions. 1 6 2 It is with this one sentence, that the Second Circuit and other courts have bootstrapped the application of federal
administrative law to local zoning decisions. The Second Circuit cites the
United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB 1 6 3 in defining substantial evidence. 164 Application of that
decision makes little sense when one considers that the Supreme Court in
Universal Camera was interpreting the language of the federal Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and not state administrative law. 16 5 Congress
certainly did not intend to apply the APA to state and local administrative
proceedings via one ambiguous sentence in a legislative report.
The Fourth Circuit in City Council of Virginia Beach applied a more

lenient definition of substantial evidence in noting that the decisionmakers under section 332(c) (7) (B) (iii) are not federal administrative
158. See id. (commenting on existence of section 332(c) (7) (B)(iii) (1994 &
Supp. 1997)).
159. See id. (citing Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457,
1468 (N.D. Ala. 1997)); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Farmington, No. 3.97 CV
863(GLG), 1997 WL 631104, at *6 (D. Conn. Oct. 6, 1997); Sprint Spectrum, L.P.
v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Sprint Spectrum,
L.P. v. Town of West Seneca, 659 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
160. See City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 428-29 (explaining need to
balance two seemingly competing goals).
161. See Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.
1999) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 470 (1996)).
162. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 104-458, at 470.
163. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
164. See Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d at 494 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (discussing need for providing definition of substantial evidence).
165. See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 476 (interpreting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
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agencies, but state and local administrative agencies and legislators. 16 6 Instead of applying the more searching standard encompassed in federal
administrative law, the court used a reasonable decisionmaker approach.1 67 In interpreting substantial evidence, the Fourth Circuit recognized that Congress refused to abolish local authority over zoning of
personal wireless services. 1 68 The court noted that a more lenient definition was needed given the nature of zoning hearings. Under the Second
Circuit's approach, the PWS industry's land use lawyers would always win
given the level of sophistication of their evidentiary presentations compared to the much less sophisticated, and usually unorganized, effort that
is typical of general citizen opposition. 169
2.

Why Congress Intended to Preserve More Local Control Than Many
Courts Think

What the Fourth Circuit confronts, and the Second Circuit and other
courts ignore, is that section 332(c) (7) has two goals, not one. Courts like
the Second Circuit have chosen to focus on the overarching goal of the
TCA in general-increasing competition and reducing barriers to entry.
These courts, however, have ignored the stated goal of section 332(c) (7)
which is stamped across the provision-preservation of local zoning authority. 170 The courts that apply a broad interpretation of section
332(c) (7) fail to recognize that the preemption provisions that were originally encapsulated in the House bill are radically different from the ones
that came out of the Conference Committee and were subsequently
signed into law. 171 Several members of the Conference Committee were
unhappy with the sweeping preemption contained in the original House
172
bill and sought to change it to preserve local control.
166. See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d
423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing between federal and state and local
actors).
167. See id. (explaining that traditional federal administrative law is inapplicable to Virginia Beach City Council).
168. See id. (commenting on Congressional intent).
169. See id. at 431 (stating that "[aippellees [the applicants], by urging us to
hold that such a predictable barrage mandates that local governments approve
applications, effectively demand that we interpret the Act so as always to thwart
average, nonexpert citizens; that is, to thwart democracy").
170. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (laying out regulatory
framework entitled "Preservation of local zoning authority").
171. See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d
Cir. 1999) (describing legislative intent). The Second Circuit mistakenly stated
that the goal of section 332 (c) (7) was to create "the National Wireless Telecommunications Siting Policy." Id. This language, however, comes from the House Bill,
which would have delegated zoning decisions to the FCC. See H.R. 1555, 104th
Cong. § 107 (1995) (discussing congressional intent for telecommunications markets). This framework was defeated in Conference. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104458, at 470 (1996) (rejecting House bill's centralized regulatory framework).

172. For a discussion of the changes made by Conference Committee, see
supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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Most of all, what these courts have failed to examine-beyond the
legislative history of the TCA itself-was the general mood of the new Republican majority, the 104th Congress. This was a Congress whose stated
goal was to return governmental power to state and local governmentsdevolution. 1 73 If the 104th Congress actually intended to pass a statute
with a sweeping preemption provision, would they really have entitled it
"Preservation of local zoning authority?"
IV.

CONCLUSION

The ability of local governments to regulate the siting of PWS facilities
has been curtailed by the passage of section 332(c) (7) in the TCA. One
cannot examine the scope of the curtailment, however, without examining
the numerous, and many times conflicting, judicial interpretations of the
preemption provisions. It has been the job of the courts to balance the
two stated goals of section 332(c) (7)-removing barriers to entry and preserving local zoning control of PWS facility siting decisions. Although
there appears to be a split in judicial opinion over which one of these
1 74
stated goals carries the most weight, the decision is far from settled.
The most important questions are what does this all mean for local
governments and what does this all mean for the citizens who show up at
local zoning boards to voice their concerns about a PWS facility siting. For
local governments, it means that they will have to wade through the everincreasing and ever-changing amount of case law on section 332(c) (7) in
devising an effective and legal regulatory scheme. For the citizens at the
zoning board hearings, it means that they will have to voice their concerns
to local governmental officials who are just as confused as they are.
Matthew N. McClure

173. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITrEE, supra note 39.
174. For a discussion on the split of judicial authority concerning Congressional intent, see supra notes 142-60 and accompanying text.
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